There are no original arguments here, except in trying to bring forth a favourable view for the issue from a view opposing it. And the opposing views in this case are undoubtedly Catholic, moralist and conservative.
The Catholic argument against divorce in Malta bases itself, at least partially, on philosophy extraneous to Christianity, i.e. on natural law which is a Thomistic re-interpretation of Aristotle's views on human nature. The basic, simplified argument here is that it is a natural law for human societies to rest on stable, long-living, monogamous marriages. Other Christians, such as the Orthodox in particular, point out that Augustine himself - whom the Catholic Church rests on - holds that what is natural for human society is what precedes the Fall, whereas humans presently exist in a post-Fall condition. The Orthodox argument carries further in pointing out that Catholicism's dependency on natural law is a piece of paganism, which affirms a Fallen world and nature. The more religious, and properly Christian, argument is related: this holds that Christ re-instated the original marriage - the original Adam and Eve relation - and thus the Catholic answer to Orthodoxy is that Christ has, in fact, re-instated some elements of pre-Fall nature.
In any case, however, looking at Christ's oft-quoted referral to divorce - i.e. Mat 5:32: "But I say to you, Whoever puts away his wife, apart from a matter of fornication, causes her to commit adultery. And whoever shall marry the one put away commits adultery" - it would, at a basic reading, seem that the Catholic Church is willfully ignoring one clause of the statement, which is "apart from a matter of fornication" (porneia:- sexual misconduct). The basic fact, therefore, is that Christ makes one allowance, for divorce, which the Church isn't willing to accept or even discuss. Even so, it must be noted that for the Christian (but not necessarily for everyone else), divorce is an extremely serious matter.
A further argument can be drawn from Matthew Ch. 5, and that's the fact that this chapter expresses what I find to be a shockingly honest ethical philosophy. Amongst other precepts which Christ expresses in Chapter 5, there are two which are of interest - namely verse 33 and verse 39. Verse 33 is an outright prohibition against the taking of oaths, since the Christian is expected to tell the truth always. Verse 39 is the prohibition of returning evil for evil, to resist evil and, in extremis, a prohibition against self-defence.
It appears that while the Church is adamant that the Christian - and everyone else for that matter - shall not divorce, it is not similarly adamant that Christians should not take oaths. In fact, Catholic doctrine on the matter dictates that one should not take oaths falsely - precisely what Christ juxtaposes his precept against.
Again, while the Church is adamant that no Christian shall divorce, it is not similarly adamant that no Christian shall take up the sword. Why is a Christian who becomes a soldier, or a Christian leader who starts a war, not similarly refused sacraments or excommunicated on the same exact grounds, and with the same zeal, that a Christian who divorces or who intends on voting Yes in the divorce referendum? Why, in view of Christ's precepts, is the legalisation of war not fought with the same ardour as the legalisation of divorce? What gives? Are some of Christ's precepts more important than others? I fear that though the Church is largely right in expressing Christian values - divorce being no light matter - it is however guilty of zealotry. They might find pre-Catholic Chesterton's admonition useful: "A heresy is a fragment of the truth that is exaggerated at the expense of the rest."
The opposition to divorce on moral grounds, forgets that a basic fact for morality is the ability to choose. The Classical and Christian traditions in the West have long come to understand that there is a difference between what is moral and what is legal, that what is legal is not necessarily moral and that what is moral is not necessarily legal. Furthermore, avoiding an evil because it is illegal has little moral merit, because morality is built on choice - one must fully choose good or evil to be meritous.
Apart from a few obvious cases that preserve immediate order, the law does not seek to enforce morality. Promiscuity may be judged immoral from several angles - medical as well as religious - and yet it is not illegal, nor would anyone think to make it illegal. Of the Ten Commandments, the basis of Judeo-Christian religious morality, only three of the moral imperatives are actually illegal. Therefore, even if one argues successfully that divorce is immoral from several angles be they social, personal or religious, the case that divorce should be illegal because it is immoral does not hold.
Should we wish to take a conservative view, and be consistent about it, we should find that the troubles that the divorce issue highlights are much deeper than keeping divorce illegal can solve. The problem for the family is rooted in an individualist, economy-centred society. The nuclear family itself is already an impoverished 20th century version of the original, extended, communal family. It is the individualism empowering each and every member of the family that weakens the family.
This is not necessarily an evil thing either. The family is strongest when there exists a solid paterfamilias tradition and there is a strong, fatherly authority. So we find ourselves juggling value against value: what are our priorities? The conservative should understand that to fight against the legalisation of divorce is merely to fight an effect of a deeper cause. To maintain marriage by keeping away divorce is merely to protect ruins from demolition.
To combine both these points, a society in which families and couples stay together because divorce is illegal is not a stronger society, but a society maintained by illusions.
Tilaru
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